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PATIENT SUFFERING AND THE ANOINTING
OFTHESICK
M. Therese Lysaught
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A physician. reflecting on the early days of his
medical training. recounts a relationship with a patient
suffering from a rare form of bone cancer. He recalls the
following:
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In the hospital. it was the habit [of this patient] to roam the

han, late at night after his wife

and small children had gone to
their lodging. I never asked him whether;t was pain that kept him
moving or perhaps loneliness and a simple desire for
conversation. One night, having completed my work fOT the day,
feeling too tired to read on my own, and facing no other prospect
buttogive in to sleep, I felt like talking.

On that night, and on other nights following, we discussed
nothing in particular. Our conversation might turn to his
aspirations at work. ... ar La my thoughts about medicine. For a time
he would lalk about his plans for the future as though they were
Jilll foremost in his mind. but before long he would lapse in to the
past tense and grow sullen. I think that a part of him was looking
for encouragement. but whatlitt.1e I knew of his condition made

medical reassurance nearly impOSSible. I hid from his pain by
focu'ing on the bright side of things. It was a kind of dishonesty,
though at that early point in my medical training I did not
recognize it as such. 'What we had was better than silence, but we
r.Ncr really talked.
One night. after I had been away for several days, I met him
19;tin in the semidark hallway ncar the nurses' station. He was
asking a nurse to bring something to his room ...For some reason,
she proceeded to introduce the two of us - a rare event by

hospital standards. Equally strange. neither he nor I spoke up to
g,y that we aJeady knew one another. I put out my hand to shake
his, and he stancd to do the same; then it hit me: his arm was
Illissing, It had been amputated as part of his treatmenL I should
hive anticipated the amputation ... but it came as a surprisc to me.
In the inSlant before my hand withdrew and I looked down, at a
loss for what to say or do, ] caught in his eyes a look of sorrow,
perhaps even shame. I begged his pardon, but we did not speak
further...We never met again. (Gunderman 1!>-16)
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A week or so later. the patient dies. and the rapidity
of the deterioration and the injustice of the illness creates a
crisis for the physician. He feels that he has failed this
patient. though not medically as this was not his patient.
He senses that he has failed morally, although according to
the principles and canons of biomedical ethics. he has
done nothing ·wrong.' The physician is disturbed that
nothing in his medical training or in his medical ethics
prepared him. guided him. instructed him in how to attend
to this man's pain and suffering.
.

As it did whh this physician, sutT~ring confronts us.
compels us, and condemns us. It confronts us with shock
that can upheave our unified, positive, progressive vision of

our world, our lives, and our selves. It compels us to actto alleviate it or to flee from it-in order to ' restore our
sense of unity shattered by its eruption into our present. It
condemns us-our fictions of uni 1y, peace and
invulnerability. our factual selfcentered"ess and complicity
in its creation and sustenance, our paralysis in its face -and
our evasion of responsibility.
Suffering similarly confronts theological theory.
accusing it of being ephemeral and inadequate. assuming ~
the role of a problematic. a contradiction. a paradox. It
compels us to speak words that comfort and justify. It
condemns all theorizing that posits a metastructure more ,
important than the real and everyday or that posits a Go'd
who could cause or allow suffering. convicting it of
complicity and generativity of conditions, of privileging an
air-tight image of God that we have created over the chaos
of those who suffer.
SutTering similarly convicts biomedical ethical theory. "
In confronting biomedical ethics, the physical and social
suffering of patients rarely finds itself addressed
adequately_ The reality of this suffering condemns a
biomedical ethics that privileges the construction of clean
and clear formulaic principles aimed primarily at
facilitating the decision-making of medical practitioners
and that allies itself with a theoretical structure which
cannot account for the suffering of patients - a suffering ,"
which is the raison d 'elre for medicine and the locus for
much of the moral significance of medicine. As for this
15

physician, the suITerings of patients compel us to look
beyond biomedical ethics.
This essay, then, undertakes three tas~s. Part ?ne
offers a construction of some of the pllliosophlcal
commitments of biomedical ethics, arguing that these
prevent it from adequately conceptualizing two crucial
characteristics of patients: (I) the fact that they are
suITering and (2) religious/moral interpretations patients
give to their own suffering. In order to highlight this
problem, part two describes some of the dynamics of
suffering as drawn from narratives of patients and
phenomenological analyses of suITering. Finally, part three
reflects on one way in which the Christian tradition has
incorporated these dimensions of sickness and suITering
into its corporate life, namely the Rite of the Anointing of
the Sick.
BJOMFlllCAL ETIIlCS ANn ITS n!EORETICAL ALLIANcES

Biomedical ethics failed this physician, failed to give
him the conceptual or moral tools with which to act or to
understand his lack of actions. It failed to convict his
actions as wrong, although he profoundly knew that he had
behaved badly. \\~Iat do we mean by 'biomedical ethics' in
this context, and why do they often fail to provide the
ncce~sa'i' guidance or illumination?
Oiomedical elhics might profitably be understood as a
jdj~c'oursc' in the Foucauldian sense. Arthur Frank defines
discourses as ·cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities
a.nd limitations, which bodies experience as already there
for their seU undcrslanding ...These mappings form the
normalive parameters of how the body can understand
itself" (Frank 48). By situating themselves at the
intc~,cction of a number of discourses offered by societies,
indil,duals formulatc what Frank calls a 'code' by which we
understand, and hence navigate, both the world and our
id~nlilics. Biomedical ethics, then, insofar as it offen
,;;cietal expectations of normative ideals of individual
performailce, might be understood to function in part as
an agent of social regulation.
> This might seem a strange categorization for those of
us familiar with a biomedical ethic that speaks the language
cir,principlcs, rights, autonomy, and decision-making. But
, the power of this description is evident in H. Tristram
,.Engelhardt's Foundations of Bioe/hies. Engelhardt is the most
articulate and forthright spokesperson for Ihe majority
p;,siiion in biomedical ethics, namely 'pluralist biomedical
etl;ics.'1 Pluralist biom edical ethics sec themselves as a
~s~~c;al attempt at secular ethics, n d~rivcd from the '"'logic
pluralism, • a logic which seeks to describe a neutral
framework for the peaceable resolution of con troversies.
(Engelhardt 6, II, 39)
"'!:,t:t} To create this framework, pluralist biomedical ethics
utilize normative anthropological and sociological dualisms
th~ t structure of the liberal philosophy of pluralist society.
The taken for granted dichotomies of mind/body,
'reason/desire, public/private, lead Engelhardt to make
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some bold claims. First of all, he posits the morallandscap<
as bifurcated into "two tiers" mirroring tradition.1
distinctions between public and private. These "\Wo tie~'
of the moral life he names the "peaceable secular
community" and ·particular moral communities' (54). The
"peaceable secular community" functions as a conceptual
space in which public disputes are resolved by 'rational'
(i.e.,impartial, unprejudiced, anyonymous, universal)
arguments made by rational beings "anywhere in the
cosmos" who have transcended the boundaries of th.ir
particular communities (10,81, 105); ethical reasoning
and moraljudgments derive authority through correlatiom
with procedures of this general standpoint and not from
any particular content.
\W,i!C the second tier, particular moral communiti~
is the locus of moral content and meaning, thm
communities rely on premises that, because of their
particularity, "cannot be secured by [rational) argumen\'
so that judgmen ts of these communities cannot b.
validated as "rationally" autllOritative (54). Particularities
and affectivities, commitments nurtured within particular
moral communities, which for our purposes mean!
especially religious commitments and convictions, th,refore,
cannot be admitted as premises in rational ~or~1
arguments. While moral agents live Iheir lives wlthrn
particular, substantial, concrete communities, for moral
purposes they must disembed themselves from these
attachments if they wish to function in the public, mo"}
domain.
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Engelhardt also provides criteria for membership in
the 'peaceable secular community,' criteria lhala re
necessary insofar as "not all humans are equal... [as he sa),J
persons not humans are special" (104). The criter"i
namely, rationality, self-consciousn e ss, and a sense 0
worthiness of blame and praise, define a being as an
autonomous moral agent. A body-a human body-d~s
not qualify one to be a moral agent; correlatively, bod~eI
are not theoretically required for moral agency. Bod'"
tend to be practical correlatives of moral agents, but they
have no moral or rational value or content.
,
This distinction between 'persons' and 'human~
greatly simplifies the task of biomedical ethics. Engelhar I
argues that there are only two methods by wh ·IC h t0 resoll'<
•
an ethIcal
controversy: agreed-to procedures or <lore e. Th'
autonomy of the members of the 'peaceable secular
community' constrains society and other persons from
using 'unconsentcd-to' force against them. But Inon;
persons,' who can make no claim to autonomy, are no
protected from such force.
Thus, a contradiction becomes apparent. On th~ on.'
hand, a primary object of pluralist biomedical ethiCS
'bodies', and the task is to authorize leui
timate use off( or'be
0 - .
against bodies-for example, who decides what IS a do
done with a particular (now incompetent) body; when b I
we stop sustaining a body; when do we let new-born U
S
malformed bodies expire; should we kill bodies; whO '
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body will have access to health care? But this same human
body does not count as a legitimate epistemological Of
even anthropological moral resource. Moral subjectivity is
equated with rational mind, and 'knowledge' is available
only of those things predicated as accessible to all minds;
human embodiment, the locus of human illness and
suffering and the site of the practice of medicine, are
overlooked. 2
THE SUFFERINGS OF PATIENTS

The patient's suffering and pain convict the
physician of moral failing. 3 If biomedical ethics were to
attend to the embodied sufferings of patients, what might
they discover?
If nothing else, they would discover that the
sufferings of the sick differ widely. This fact alone renders
suffering inaccessible to biomedical ethics (See Smith 261).
Not only are different kinds of sufferings associated with
different kinds of ilInesses--emergency traumatic injury vs.
chronic illness vs. terminal illness that moves rapidly vs. a
life·threatening condition that persists for twenty years vs.
illness thathas intense social stigmas--but each individual
body will be inscribed differently by the intersection of the
cultural discourses of class, race, gender, agc, religion,
science and politics with the individual's personal history.
The matrix comprised of these intersections of discourses,
relationships, and histories, provides our ongoing identity,
the code by which each individual deciphers and
negotiates the world. In instances of suffering, this 'code' is
broken.
In spite of this irreducible particularity,
phenomenological and autobiographical accounts of
suffering note three consistent dynamics. In the first
dynamic, experiences of illness or pain often re .. situate
palien ts' vis-a-vis their bodies, re-ordering taken-forgranted relationships between "self" and "body."
Experiences of illness serve as a reminder that "selves"

depend on the integrity of bodies, that health and lives are
radically contingent. In illness the body often moves from
the background to the forefront of perception, and
patients increasingly identify their selves with their bodies,
a move which also unfortunately often encourages medical
professionals (0 do the same. Some describe this aspect of
patients' experiences as "essentially an ontological assault"
in which the body becomes the enemy, in terposing itself
between "us and reality," standing "opposite the self,"
(Pellegrino/Thomasma 207-208) challenging a culturally
instilled sense of the transcendence of self over body.
While this reorien tali on can be illuminating, more
likely it can be alienating. Pain and illness can first effect
alienation by counteracting "Ille human being's capacity to
move out beyond the boundaries of his or her own body
into the external, sharable world" (Scarry 13). Restrictive
and dissociative, pain "chains down our thoughts," breaks
Connections between "body" and "world." In addition to
impeding motion beyond personal boundaries, pain also
February 1992

alters the nature of these boundaries: "It is the intense
pain that destroys a person's self and world, a destruction
experienced spatially as either the contraction of the
universe down to the immediate vicinity of Ille body or as
the body swelling to fill the entire universe" (Scarry 35).
The body can become one's "world" as pain occupies more
and more of one's consciousness and crowds out awareness
of anything else. Alienation can also be effected by
experiencing the body as the "enemy," the "agent of the
agony."
Secondly, patients often experience a loss or
usurpation of their "voice." Voice may literally be "lost" as
a function of pain, or legitimate "voice" may be denied or
repressed because it does not fit with normative medical or
moral language. As Elaine Scarry notes, one characteristic
of physical pain is that, for the most part, it is
"inexpressible." While I can tell you of my pain, for
example, there is no way for you to truly grasp its realityeither that it is rea1, or how rca], how intense it is; your
doubt of my pain cannot be decisively dispelled (4). This
inexpressibility, this unsharability, can isolate patients from
those close to them and prevent them from effectively
communicating their distress to medical practitioners.
Moreover, Scarry continues, "pain docs not simply resist
language, but [can] actively destroy it, bringing about an
immedjate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the

sounds and cries a human being makes before language is
learned" (Scarry 4). (An alternative suggestion is that these
sounds actually are the language of pain.) It can achieve
this effect because, physical pain resists objectification.
Undoubtedly, this characteristic of pain underlies
medicine's tendency to identify patients with their bodies:
this identification is a fust step in trying to "objectity" the
pain, to give it the referent, the object, that it lacks. As
Arthur Frank notes, illness can also result in "the loss of
capacity to express through the body" (Frank 85),
But in many ways, the medical establishment furthers
the patient's experience of loss of voice. As many have
noted, when it comes to medicine, dIe patient is a "'stranger

in a strange land" (Engelhardt 256); medicine is foreign
country filled with unfamiliar languages and customs.
Kleinman, for example, perceptively comments on how
medical facilities seem designed to be navigated only by
those who are familiar with Illem. Often, patients' lack of
knowledge of the language of medicine can intimidate
thcm, leaving them speechless. Whcn patients do "fmd"
their voice, they often speak of the "lived experience" of
their illness in non~scientific and often subjective
"common-sense ways accessible to all lay persons in their
social group" (Kleinman 4). But, all too often, in order to
participate in the medical cure, patients must conform
themselves to the world of medicine rather than vice versa,
learning its language; their accounts of their own illness
are translated into the language of the profession.
Kleinman notes that practitioners "have been taught
to regard with suspicion patients' illness narratives and
17

-

causal beliefs" (17). Physicians often feel they hav~ to sift
oUl rneaning frorn confused and messy narrat.ves of
palienls, listening selectively "so tha~ some aspects are
carefully listened for and heard (somet.mes when they arc
nOlspoken), while other things that are said-and even
repeated-are literally not heard" (Kleinman 52, 16; Scarry
0.7). 'Subjective' experiences of patients' illnesses become
'objective' categorized diseases. Moreover, not only are
patients' narratives at times suspect, but at times, as a result
of the "inexpressibility" of their pain, patients' claims of
illness or pain arc doubted, if not explicitly denied,
especially in the cases of chronically ill patients or in cases
where the ·explanatory framework" of medicine has not yet
shifted to allow an illness into "reality." (Contemporary
examples of U,is might include early suITerers of AIDS and
chronic fatigue syndrome.) Alternatively, patients who
reject a diagnosis of disease, or who do not conform to
acceptable modes of dealing with a diagnosis, may be
labelled as "in denial"; the physiological "interpretation" is
given higher epistemic status than the patient's lived
experiential interpretations. Patients, along with their
voice" can be rendered inadequate, unhelpful, wrong,
inactive, silenced.
Rut, just as a crucial characteristic of suffering is its
ability to dissolve and destroy language, a first step toward
dis.olving and destroying suffering, then, is linguistic. As
pain and suITering "resist objectification in language" and
de·objectify the world, they can be only overcome by
"forcing [them] into avenues of objectification," an
objectification correlated with the body in which they
reside. (Scarry 5,6, 17; sec also Soclle 7()'72) We lind this
same notion of "objectification" in descriptions of "work."
Work, an inextricably social process, is the vehicle through
which we "objectify· ourselves, a multi-directional process
through which the 'self" is constituted and through which
the ,elf constitutes U,e "world." Dorothee Soelle employs
U,is concept to suggest that "working on" suffering is best
understood as "transforming the act of suffering into
purposeful activity ... nothing [she maintains] can be
Icamed from suffering unless it is worked through' (126).
A fundamental shape !hat this work takes in the lives
of U,e ill and suITering is that of creation of 'narratives.' As
Kleinman 'noles, "the illness narrative is a story the patient
tells, and significant o!hers retell, to give coherence to the
di'tinctive evenls and long-term course of the suffering"
(49). Kleinman further affirms that not only does !he story
reflect the experience of illness, "but rather it contributes
to the experience of symptoms and suITering" (49). Arthur
Frank. confirms this process, noting that "in illness, the
body finds itself progressively unable to express ilseJf in
convenlional codes. Sometimes, with the right kind of
support, it creates a new code" (85).
It is noteworthy that Frank remarks, "with the right
kind of support.· The dynamics of suffering in illness all
contribute to a sense of isolation and marginalization
voiced by many who have been ill. Consequently, this
procc'ss· or~ narrative creation depends on the resources,

""ou
options and opportunities offered to th~ indi\'id~al by the
witl
social situation. Often these prove Illsuffic.enl. BUI
fur
importantly, those who initiate this narrative process need
v"cr
not be the victims of suffering themselves; in fact, often
cat
they cannot be. Thus Kleinman includes as a "core clinical
wil
task" what he caUs "empathetic witnessing. That is the
cle
existential commitment to be with the sick person and to
pe'
facilitate his or her building of an illness narrative that ,ill
make sense of and give value to the experience" (54; I<e
pr
also Scarry 6) This corporate dimension is indispensable in
(0
the dissolution of suffering, for the sufferer to move [rom
th
the state of isolation caused by the destruction o[ her
world, through expression and communication 10
'1
I(
solidarity through which change is possible. Thus, potential
~
for deriving meaning from suffering lies not in some
tI
inherent quality SUffering possesses, nor in the abiliries of
k'
its victims. It lies rather in the resources oITered by socielJ'
and in the willingness of individuals to participate in this
process, to enter into solidarity, to pay "attention" to ibose
II
who suffer.
SUFFERING AND

IlLNFSS IN A LITuRGICAL FRAMEWORK

Given the secular commitments of pluralist
biomedical ethics described in section one, the Christian
community might seem an unlikely place to turn to find
resources to aid and inform our physician. But Christian
tradition has, from its earliest beginnings, been
significantly committed to attending those who suffer. This
commitment has led to the development of practices which
in their contemporary forms attend to many of the
dynamics of suffering outlined above and thereby shape
contemporary Christian relationships to suffering, both
individual and communal. In this third section, I would
like to focus on one practice in particular- liturgical rites
of anointing and healing. For our purposes, I will draw on
the Roman Catholic tradition's Sacrament of the Anointing
of the Sick.
Before turning to the Rite, it is important to highlight
the centrality of suffering and healing in Christian practice.
Healing the sick was one of three primary activities
associated by the Evangelists with Jesus' ministry,
inextricably linked with his prcaching and teaching. John
Dominic Crossan, in a recen t article, attends to this fact
and suggests that Jesus' particular bodily practices (i.e.,
eating and healing) e mbodied his message and had radical
re1igiopolitical ramifications. Crossan locales his argument
within the matrix of anthropological claims that correlate
regulation of bodily boundaries with regulation of social
boundaries. Drawing on Mary Douglas, Peter Farb and
George Armelagos, as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Caroline
Walker Bynum, Crossan begins with the position that in
Jesus' Jewish culture, who one ate with defined and
identified one's location in the social matrix: "those
decisions about what we eat, where we eat, when we eat,
and above all, with whom we eat... form a miniature map of
our social distinctio ns and hierarchies" (1195). It probably
Tn. CrrJS,l
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would have been rare, we can imagine, to find a Jew eating
with a Samaritan or a Pharisee with a tax collector.
furthermore, bodie, who were sick, menstruating or dead
were denoted as ritually "unclean" and would have been
categorized as those one ought not touch, let alone eat
with. Thus, food customs and illness customs provided
clear social divisions, with some designations excluding
people entirely.
Within this matrix, Crossan argues, Jesus'
proclamation of the advent of the Kingdom of God
contained a radical social challenge. Crossan maintains
that]esus' practices and message championed a radically
egalitarian "reciprocity of open eating and open healing"
(Crossan 1195). Thus we findJesus scandalizing on-lookers
by those he chooses to eat with (tax collectors and sinners,
taking water from a Samaritan woman). Parables tell of the
kinds of people he healed-lepers, the blind, the lame, a
Woman "with a flow of blood "-those understood within
the culture to be blemished or unclean. And importantly,
in these parables it is clear thatJ esus often healed by touch,
as Crossan notes:
lfesusj healed the illness by refusing to accept the official
quarantine, by refusing to stay separate from the sick

person~

by

touching him [or her], and thereby confronting others with a
challenge and a choice. By so doing, of course, he was making
extremely subversive claims about who defined the community,
i\'ho patrolled its boundaries, who controlled its entries and exits,

who, in other words, was in charge." (1197)
Crossan implies that these two practices-open eating
and open healing-were iden tifiable marks of what he calls
the jesus movement." Those who had been healed were
enjoined only to carry the message, and those who carried
lhe message were charged to carry with them no other
provisions but to trust that message and miracle would
open the homes and hearths of those they healed. These
two practices are embodied in the contemporary Church in
the Eucharist and in the practice of ministry to the sick.
While this is not the place to argue for a stronger liturgical
and ecelesial understanding of the constitutive nature of
the I~lter practice, I would like to suggest that Christian
ItturgIeS of healing, at least as represented in the Roman
Catholic Rite, are both responsive to the existential
situation of those who suffer and continue to embody the
meaning thatJesus' healing practices suggest.

As can be seen from the text of its In troduction, the
Rill of Anointing and Pas/fffal Care of llu Sick responds to a
~umber of the dynamics of tlle sufferings of patients noted
1~ part two above. First of all, the Rite is fundamentally
Itturgical, reconfigured from its earlier privatized forms in
Itght of the Second Vatican Council call to liturgical
renewal. Properly liturgical actions embody and intend the
Church as a whole, and the Introduction to the Rite
stresses this corporate dimension:
F,bruary 1992

like the other sacraments, these too have a communal aspect,

which should be brought out as much as possible when they are
celebrated .... The faithful should clearly understand the meaning
of the anointing of the sick so that these sacraments may nourish,
strengthen, and express faith. It is most important for the faithful
in general, and above all for the sick, to be aided by participating
in it, especially if it is to be carried out communally. ("Rite of

Anointing" 191)
The communal context of the action emphasizes that,
overagainst the social and cultural realities of isolation and
marginalization that attend illness, the sick are not alone.
The ecdesial community continues to understand them as
included, and in fact, to be an integral part of the
community: "If one member suffers in the body of Christ,
which is the Church, all the members suITer with him" (I
Corinthians 12:26). ("Rite of Anointing" 190) This bond is
reinforced in the ritual actions of touch-the laying on of
hands and the anointing.
In addition to communal support being integral to
ameliorating the burdens of suffering, in part two Scarry,
Kleinman, Soe\le and others further suggested the
importance of "working on" or "transforming the suffering
into purposeful activity." The Rite of Anointing of the Sick
as a liturgical act can be understood as 'work' in precisely
this sense. On the one hand this dimension can be seen
etymologically, as the Greek term 'Ieitourgia' is derived
from the two terms 'leos' (people) and 'ergou' (work).
'Liturgy' is precisely 'work' done by all the people in the
Body of Christ. Equally importantly, in the Rite, it is 'work'
done by the the sick person. The sick person is not
understood as passive and, in fact, is enjoined specia1
duties and activities which give meaning to their sutTering:
The sick in return offer a sign to the community: In the
celebration of the sacrament they give witness to their promises at

baptism to die and be buried with Christ. They tell the
community tha~ in their present suffering they are prepared to fill
up in their flesh what is lacking in Christ's sufferings for the

salvation of the world ...Thc sick are assured that their suffering is
not 'useless' but 'has meaning and value for their own salvation

and the salvation of the world· .... And the sick are bditrl,d to be
and seen as productive members of the community, contributing
to the welfare of all by associating themselves freely with Christ's

passion and death .... In the sacrament, the faith of the sick person

gives us, the healthy, a sign-an embodiment-of the words of
Paul to Timothy: 'You can depend on this: If we have died with
him, we shall also live with him. Ifwe hold out to the end, we shall
also reign with him' (2Tm 2:12). (Study Ttx~ 2().21)
The sick are challenged not to isolate themselves
from the community, not to withdraw in embarrassment or
fear. They are called to continue acting as a part of the
body of Christ, called to forge ahead in the face of their
difficulties, modelling discipleship and sO serving as
"minister to the whole church in their illness"(Sludy Text,
19

41). In Ihis way, "meaningless" suffering-of.w~ich
surrering associated with illness is cspcciaIJy a case-Is given
a usc, purpose, meaning.
.. .
. Finally, we nOled in part two that Illness mfhcts
suffering partly by breaking apart a person's "code" -that
sci of discourses, relationships, and histories by which one
understands and inlerprets one's world and identity. The
Rite addrcs~cs lhis in lWO ways. On the one hand, most of
Ihose 10 whom Ihis Rile reaches inhabit 3 'code' derived
partly from Christian formation and partly from secular
cullure. In insL~nces of illness, especially in contemporary
Western culture, part of the crisis of illness is created by
presuppositions supplied by secular culture. For example,
illne", can pose a grave threat not only to psychological
identily but also 10 physical security in a culture that values
10 Ihe poinl of ideology Ihe idea of individual autonomy.
lIy. preaching and living the gospel of a God who is
essentially dependent and self-giving, the sacramental rite
informs those who practice it ",;th an alternative vision of
Ihe world.
On Ille other hand, as we noted above, Kleinman and
olhe ... advocale th.llh ose involved wilh the sick encourage
Ihe crealion of 'narralives.' While Ihis is important, the
Church, especially Ihrough the practice of the Rite of
Anoinling of Ihe Sick, invites those who suffer to locate
their narratives in an ongoing story, tolearn anew the
slories of others who have suffered and the interpretations
they gave Il,eir experiences, to truly hear-possibly for Ille
first lime-what it means to worship a God whose
rclationshlp to humanity was revealed on a cross.

SACRAlIIENTS AND

.,

MEDICAL ETHlCS?

II might be objected Illat all this is well and good, but
il doesn't really aid us in Il,e difficult task of making day-today decisions aboul which technologies to usc, and when,
and for how long. But the power of the simple dynamic
iuvoh'cd in these liturgical riles is easy to underestimate
when compared to the power exercised by biomedical
technologies and interventions. Like Jesus' practices of
open eating and open healing, Christian understandings of
suffering, illness and healing embodied in the riles and
lit'u rgies of common worship challenge contemporary
cultural understandings. The Church's 'discourses'
cha llenge those of secular society. They refuse to locate a
creature's\-aluc solely in its rationality, refusing to accept
Ihedesignation 'enemy' for the realilies of suffering and
dcalh~ refusing to validate 3. posture that is closed to the
world and fearful and ostracizing of UlDse who are 'olller.'
Those physicians and patients formed by ccclesial
praclices of Christian communities will find themselves
na,'igatingthe world of medicine and biomedical ethics
along a ' different path, for what they sec as 'persons,'
'thieats,' 'dilemmas,' and even 'the world' may differ
i signficantly from their colleagues. For the ph}~ician whose
.. Slo'r,y opened these renections, the Sacrament of the
.J,
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Anointing of the Sick might have supplied him with
alternative understandings of sufferings and a dispmition
toward openness and vulnerability that would have enabled
him to reach out to the patient with a touch that healed. As
importantly, it might have opened him to the touch of the
patient that would have lefl him with the hopeful memo!),
of shared community in addition to the empty sorrow of
aloneness. 0
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1I would assert the case for three approaches to biomcdiCiI
ethics: (I) pluralist-represented by Engelhard~ and the work 01
Beauchamp and Childres. in Principles; (2) an ethics 01
medicine-represented by Leon !\ass, as well as Pellegrino and
Thomasma in It Phiwsophical Basis; and (3) Roman Catholic
biomedical ethics--represenlcd by Richard A. McCormick,5J.
Lisa Sowle Cahill and Charles E. Curran.

lie
Kl'

II,

2Jt is important to emphasize here that I am distinguishing
between medical ethics and medicine. Clearly medicine attends to
bodies and the bodily in a significant manner, both conceptu~~

and practically. My remarks are directed solely at medical ethia
at this point30 n the other hand, I do not distinguish too clearly between the
notions of 'suffering' and 'pain: The distincLion, which is
commonly employed. re lates suffering to one's self and identity,
while pain is understood primarily in bodily terms. Although it il
now rather standard to make this distinction, and the distinction
can be helpful within certain arguments, I would resist ma};.ing it
loo clear~cut . as I am concerned thal it might buy intO a
mind/body dualism that will only exacerbaU! the problems I . '11

trying to address.
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